In this case, knowledge is not attainable here, if (per Plato's Meno) it is the justified belief that a proposition is in fact true when it is. But what about belief? If a proposition is unknowable, should we always suspend belief? And if not, when is it rational to hold beliefs regarding the truth of unknowable propositions?
Generally speaking, it seems intuitive that we should give a benefit of the doubt when we can't know for sure the reality of a certain state of affairs. At least to some extent. But it seems as though that in order for one to "entertain the idea" of something (i.e., to suspend belief), the case for belief must at least reach the threshold of being at least plausibly true. It seems as though if the case cannot be made that the proposition is at least plausibly true, we shouldn't entertain it to the same extent that we would plausible propositions.
The question is, what are some factors affecting plausibility? Just a few off the top of my head:
Coheres with existing knowledge: Although we can't establish truth through coherence, we can rule out what is inconsistent with what we do know. "Negative coherentism" can then be a tool to ascertain implausibility.
Credibility of the arguer: If the proponent has a history of making untrue claims, or perhaps is in a conflict of interest, it seems that they should be looked at with greater suspicion than an arguer who is highly credible, or otherwise without an interest in the claim.
How fantastic the subject matter is: If a claim is making an assertion that requires no more than what happens in every day experience, it seems as though more of a benefit of the doubt should be given, and less explaining would be required to establish plausibility.
Precariousness ("House of cards"): Fantastic + Fantastic = Even More Fantastic. If the truth of proposition rests upon a series of other "questionable" propositions to likewise be true, it seems that we should be more skeptical regarding the plausibility of the truth.
Again, these are some of the factors off the top of my head that would affect the threshold for plausibility of claim.
So to sum it up, here's my stream of consciousness about all this. Suspending belief is fine, so long as the belief in question is plausible. Plausibility requires different things in different contexts. The question on my mind right now is what it means to dismiss a proposition on grounds of plausibility. I'm not sure whether it rises to the level of disbelief. But it does seem to allocate burden to the claim failing to reach the plausibility threshold.
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