Tradition, History and the Sociology of Knowledge

Have been thinking about this a lot lately: theistic belief and the difference between knowledge gained from rational processes and from social processes. I think that most would agree, viewed from a strictly rational standpoint, that the the tenets I've outlined below are valid. But in practice, empirical phenomena such as history, tradition, and even individual psychology, also influence the social construction of belief. Concepts that are rational are not always socially persuasive due to these forces and vice versa.

The trouble is that when a source is attempting to persuade socially, if it turns out there are rational gaps, we are taught that the right course of action is to have faith. In some instances, I think this can be genuine: We don't always know all the details, and that's okay. But an appeal to faith can also become a type of "wild card" or "open cheque" that can be used to retain political control rather than to provide spiritual enlightenment. The trouble with philosophy is it only rules in the rational world. In the rest of the world, social might makes right. It makes me wonder if there's any way to make social cultures more rational and less political.

There are a couple of topical areas that could be of use here: First, the debate between liberalism and communitiarianism in contemporary political philosophy. Second, the sociology of knowledge and social construction of reality. This could help to understand how social cultures form and the role that belief and tradition play in those cultures.

Must we Disprove in order to Dismiss?

Just to summarize the last post, my thinking was along the lines that there are some proposals that are fantastic; and given that they are fantastic, you don't have to entertain them to dismiss them as implausible. The reason is that anyone can construct a non-verifiable, irrefutable, and consistent theory to explain a given phenomenon. And when you have one story that can fit the bill, you can construct another one, more complex and more fantastic. And one after that, and one after that, ad infinitum. The question is, is it rational to entertain every non-verifiable, irrefutable, and consistent theory? Do you have to disprove a theory in order to dismiss it?

Imperfect Knowledge and the Plausibility Requirement

When should we take a position on the truth of a proposition, when the truth is currently unknowable, and will (for the indefinite future) remain unknowable?

In this case, knowledge is not attainable here, if (per Plato's Meno) it is the justified belief that a proposition is in fact true when it is. But what about belief? If a proposition is unknowable, should we always suspend belief? And if not, when is it rational to hold beliefs regarding the truth of unknowable propositions?

Generally speaking, it seems intuitive that we should give a benefit of the doubt when we can't know for sure the reality of a certain state of affairs. At least to some extent. But it seems as though that in order for one to "entertain the idea" of something (i.e., to suspend belief), the case for belief must at least reach the threshold of being at least plausibly true. It seems as though if the case cannot be made that the proposition is at least plausibly true, we shouldn't entertain it to the same extent that we would plausible propositions.

The question is, what are some factors affecting plausibility? Just a few off the top of my head:

Coheres with existing knowledge: Although we can't establish truth through coherence, we can rule out what is inconsistent with what we do know. "Negative coherentism" can then be a tool to ascertain implausibility.

Credibility of the arguer: If the proponent has a history of making untrue claims, or perhaps is in a conflict of interest, it seems that they should be looked at with greater suspicion than an arguer who is highly credible, or otherwise without an interest in the claim.

How fantastic the subject matter is: If a claim is making an assertion that requires no more than what happens in every day experience, it seems as though more of a benefit of the doubt should be given, and less explaining would be required to establish plausibility.

Precariousness ("House of cards"): Fantastic + Fantastic = Even More Fantastic. If the truth of proposition rests upon a series of other "questionable" propositions to likewise be true, it seems that we should be more skeptical regarding the plausibility of the truth.

Again, these are some of the factors off the top of my head that would affect the threshold for plausibility of claim.

So to sum it up, here's my stream of consciousness about all this. Suspending belief is fine, so long as the belief in question is plausible. Plausibility requires different things in different contexts. The question on my mind right now is what it means to dismiss a proposition on grounds of plausibility. I'm not sure whether it rises to the level of disbelief. But it does seem to allocate burden to the claim failing to reach the plausibility threshold.

The Strong vs. Weak Distinction

I just wanted to jot down some clarifying thoughts for myself on the Strong vs. Weak distinctions, since it can sometimes be a squishy topic. Theist, weak atheist, and strong atheist positions follow a similar logical structure as the following propositions:

EXAMPLE 1: THE BASIC LOGICAL STRUCTURE

1.1. I want to go to the park
1.2. It's not the case that I want to go to the park
1.3. I want not to go to the park

In this analogy, a proposition is given in (1.1), "I want to go to the park." When we negate that proposition, we get (1.2). What does (1.2) mean? It means that I have no preference to go to the park. But the question is do I have a preference not to go to the park? We do not know in this case. We only know that I have no preference to go. This could mean that I have a preference to stay home. It would be a much more strong statement to say that I have a particular preference not to go to the park as in (1.3).

EXAMPLE 2: THE BASIC LOGICAL STRUCTURE USING BELIEF

2.1. I believe Elvis Presley is alive
2.2. It's not the case that I believe Elvis Presley is alive
2.3. I believe Elvis Presley is not alive

In this case we have a proposition in (2.1), this time a statement of belief, that the King is alive. In (2.2), I have no belief that Elvis is alive. This could mean that I don't know anything about Elvis, and therefore don't know one way or another whether Elvis is alive or not. All I know in (2.2) is that there is no belief of Elvis being alive. This does not mean there is a belief that Elvis is not alive, as (2.3) requires.

EXAMPLE 3: THE BASIC LOGICAL STRUCTURE USING THEISTIC BELIEF

3.1. I believe a God exists
3.2. It's not the case that I believe a God exists
3.3. I believe a God does not exist

So from the other instances, we find our central theistic proposition in (3.1). The negation of that (3.2) says that I have no belief that a God exists. As above, this could mean I don't know anything about God, and therefore don't know one way or another whether a God exists or not. As above, all I know in (3.2) is that there is no belief of the existence of a God. This does not mean there is a belief that a God does not exist, as in (3.3).

What this means is that theistic belief is well, either theistic or atheistic; it comes down to either (3.1) or (3.2). A person either believes or does not believe in the existence of a God. However just because a person does not believe does not mean they believe in non-existence. The strong atheist requirement (3.3) goes a step further than (3.2) and requires that a person conclude the non-existence of deities.

For additional discussion on the Strong vs. Weak distinction, see Austin Cline's Strong Atheism vs. Weak Atheism: What's the Difference?

Theistic Anchoring and the Burden of Proof

A few years back, I was at work, grading papers, and overheard a conversation at a table next to mine that a couple of other teachers were having. Usually the conversations were kept pretty light, but this one in particular caught my attention as one teacher told another how an eleventh grade student of hers had mentioned that he was an atheist. She found this fascinating and, although she was a devout Christian, she could not understand how one could so confidently determine that a higher power could not exist.

The more they talked about this, what became increasingly clear (and all the more interesting) was the worldview my colleague had. She essentially looked at the world metaphysically from a theistic viewpoint and saw there was quite a good deal of evidence to corroborate that viewpoint. As a result, she was quite baffled how, with all that evidence to refute, her student would be able to say with such confidence there was no God.

This brings up some interesting key similarities and differences in the philosophical approaches between theists and atheists. We might say that each position is “anchored” to a starting point that presupposes a theory about ultimate reality. The theist is anchored in a belief, or theory, about how the world works; in the theists’ theory of things, a God exists, and all other events are filtered through that theory. Likewise, the atheist is also anchored in a belief, or theory, about how the world works. But in this case, the atheist’s view of things, a God doesn’t exist, and events are likewise filtered through that theory.

As far as differences go, of course while my colleague and other theists utilize the existence of God as an anchoring point, Atheists anchor from the perspective of non-existence. Relative to the theist’s paradigm, atheists shift the burden of proof. When the theist asks, “How can you not believe?” the atheist responds, “What reason do you have to believe?” Jake from AfterFaith.com discusses this key difference in his description of what atheism actually is:



So we can say that both the theist and atheist use anchoring premises to construct each view of reality. The question is what is the source or justification of each anchoring premise? Can we claim one position to be stronger than the other? Or perhaps more appropriately: Under what philosophical assumptions (or other circumstances) is one clearly stronger than the other?